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Global Trade and the New Millennium:
Defining the Scope of Intellectual
Property Protection of Plant Genetic
Resources and Traditional Knowledge in
India
BY MEETALI JAjN::
Introduction
As India continues to roll out the red carpet to the United States
and other developed countries in order to attract foreign investment,
it finds itself in a precarious position. On the one hand, there are
multiple pressures on the Indian government to relax its laws relating
to trade and investment barriers, a phenomenon many
euphemistically refer to as a "race to the bottom". On the other
hand, there are multiple pressures from various Indian interest groups
who are voicing their opposition to such a relaxation. One current
area of contentious debate is the strengthening of India's intellectual
property rights regime. As a member state of the World Trade
Organization (WTO), India is obligated to develop national
legislation that conforms to the global Trade-Related Intellectual
Property Rights Treaty (TRIPS) by January 1, 2000.! Given the
emerging international consensus on the need for strong protection,
India now faces the option of either acceding to the requirements of
TRIPS or accepting various penalties, including sanctions, from the
international community.
* J.D. candidate, Hastings College of the Law, 2000.
1. India has, however, a five year grace period starting in 20q1 after %,hich it
must grant product patents to drugs and pharmaceuticals in 20J5. In the interim
period between 2000 and 2005, however, India must grant exclusive marketing rights
(EMRs) to applicants for patents. See Radhika Singh, TRIPS anzendment csscntii to
protect key patents: expert, (June 22, 19t)h
<http'I.!\vw.economictimes.com/220699i22econ03.htm>.
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Even if India opts to provide strong protection for intellectual
property rights, it will have to define the limits of such protection.
This note focuses on the protection of one type of property, namely
plant genetic resources. In particular, this author will address what
should and will be the limits of protection of plant genetic resources.
Plant genetic resources are understood to be genetic materials of
plant origin that are capable of self-reproducing; materials which may
have been discovered as well as those which are yet to be discovered.2
In fact, plant genetic resources take on a double nature: as
phenotypes (individual plants) they constitute private, tangible goods;
as genotypes (information embodied in the genetic makeup of a
plant) they constitute a public good
Intellectual property rights, such as those related to plant genetic
resources, are different from the traditional global system of property
rights. Earlier, many legal doctrines recognized the almost sacrosanct
territorial sovereignty of the nation-state. Globalization, however,
has eroded many territorial rights of nation-states and replaced them
with the allocation of individual rights in a global system. These
individual rights often take an economic and commercial form. One
increasingly popular form is in an intellectual property right.
The case of India provides fertile ground for an examination of
the clash between notions of global intellectual property rights and
notions of national and local sovereignty over resources. As a large
geopolitical power with enormous unrealized economic potential,
India may act as an example for other developing countries. Many
governments now recognize that genetic resources will be a key
resource in the twenty-first century; the government of India, itself,
has declared the issue of biotechnology development to be among the
most important in its development.4
Despite strong vocal opposition from interest groups at home,
the Indian government signed on to TRIPS in 1995.' This treaty
2. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, AND GENETIC RESOURCES: AN
OECD SURVEY OF CURRENT PRACTICES AND POLICIES 12 (1996) [hereinafter
OECD].
3. See Joseph Straus, Bargaining Around the TRIPS Agreement: The Case for
Ongoing Public-Private Initiatives to Facilitate Worldwide Intellectual Property
Transactions, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 91, 104 (1998).
4. Minister for human resource development, Murali Manohar Joshi, has
announced a new scheme that will fund research projects in the field of biosciences.
See Unscientific Approach, ECON. & POL. WEEKLY, Jan. 9,1999, at 4.
5. See Shukla, Amendment of Patents Act: Why Parliament Must Defeat It,
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obligates India to implement TRIPS by January 1, 2000. However,
India has until January 1, 2005 to adopt a minimum level of patent
protection in technical areas, such as drugs and pharmaceuticals.'
Arguably, India must include the protection of its plant genetic
resources as part of its obligations under TRIPS. Part I of this Note
will discuss the international pressure exerted on India to meet its
TRIPS obligations. TRIPS presents a formidable challenge as it is
formally linked to global trade policy. Part I will also discuss the issue
of conserving India's biodiversity, including plant genetic resources.
India is also a party to the Convention on Biological Diversity.: A
distinguishing feature of this global treaty rests in its recognition of
the national sovereignty of countries over their biological diversity.
At first glance, thus, the objectives of TRIPS and the CBD conflict:
whereas the former seeks to reward the innovations of individuals
through traditional concepts of property rights, the latter seeks to
conserve biodiversity through community-based protection. Part II
will examine India's possible responses to this international pressure.
Arguments have been made in favor of and against strengthening
India's patent laws as a means by which to protect genetic resources.
However, under the language of TRIPS, this need not be India's only
option. Indeed, India can develop a sui generis' system of protection.
This Note will examine India's options for protection of its genetic
resources under a host of international agreements in which
alternative forms of legal protection, other than patent protection,
will be examined. Indeed, this author will conclude that TRIPS gives
India the flexibility to create its own legislation which is both in
conformity with the requirements of TRIPS and reconciles the
objectives of TRIPS and the CBD. Part III will take a look at the
current political situation in India. It wll also examine the various
interest groups and the influence they exert on the Indian
government. This note will consider the current legislative efforts
being made in India, by way of the Patents Bill of 1999, the draft
Biodiversity Act, and the Kerala Tribal Intellectual Property Rights
ECON. & POL. WEEKLY, Dec. 10,1994, at 3128.
6. See Singh, supra note 2.
7. See Madhav Gadgil & P.R. Seshagiri Rao, Changing the Rules of the Game,
ThE HINDu, June 14, 1998, at 25.
8. "Sui generis" means "of its own kind". These IPR systems are uniquely
tailored to apply to specific subjects and provide particular rights. Signposts to Sid
Generis Rights: Background discussion papers for the international scminar on sui
generis rights (GRAIN) 1997.
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Bill. As the millennium arrives, common denominators must be
found between these different pieces of legislation in order to
promote India's interests and protect India's resources. Finally, Part
IV will introduce some of the additional considerations of equity,
justice, and ethics in regards to drafting an innovative solution for the
issues concerned.
I. Intellectual Property Rights and National Sovereignty:
International Pressure on India
A. TRIPS
Recognizing that nations were becoming part of an increasingly
interdependent world economy, industrialized countries turned to the
Uruguay Round Agreements (URAs) of the GATT in an attempt to
secure minimum standards of intellectual property rights protection.'
GATT had a distinct advantage over existing fora for multilateral
negotiations. An intellectual property agreement concluded in
GATr would commit all GATT members to minimum intellectual
property rights standards."0 The conclusion of the URAs in 1994
established the WTO and ushered in the TRIPS agreement under its
auspices." While TRIPS provides developing and least developed
countries more time to implement its provisions, no WTO member
country is exempt from the standards set forth in the agreement. The
purpose of TRIPS was to harmonize differing national laws on
intellectual property rights. Some have regarded this treaty as a
breakthrough in the field of international trade and cooperation.
Others have severely criticized the single-mindedness with which the
developed countries pursued trade issues to the detriment of
developing countries.
A close analysis of the interplay of global and national forces in
India at the time of the URAs demonstrates that India's lack of
bargaining power in the face of economic and geopolitical realities
contributed to its muted position during the URAs. At least one
9. The WTO, in its membership, includes many developing countries because of
its allure of lower tariff benefits. See UNCTAD, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1997).
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. "What we are witnessing is nothing short of the institutionl lization of the
ever-expanding process of annexation of sovereign spaces of the developing countries
in the sphere of vital decision-making." Shukla, supra note 5, at 3127.
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scholar has noted that through the course of the negotiations, the
objectives of TRIPS became increasingly ambitious.'" Rather than
establish minimum standards of intellectual property protection, the
drafters sought to establish a worldwide intellectual property system
with relatively high standards and establish detailed enforcement
mechanisms. 4 The ineffectiveness of internal dissent within India is
reflected in the fact that despite vociferous opposition to ratification
from a wide spectrum of political and interests, the TRIPS provisions
were ratified by the Indian Parliament in 19952"
Although the Indian Patent Act of 1970 does not explicitly
prohibit the patenting of genetic resources, its language allows for this
interpretation. 6 Thus, TRIPS appears to contradict the Indian Patent
Act because it requires the protection of plant genetic resources.
However, the language of TRIPS allows for compatibility between
the two laws as it provides flexibility in how to provide patents on
plant genetic resources. Article 27.3(b) of TRIPS provides that while
member countries are not required to patent "plants and animals
other than micro-organisms," they "shall provide for the protection of
plant varieties either by patents or by an effective std generis system
or by any combination thereof."' Thus, under TRIPS, India must
protect its plant genetic resources either through patents or through a
sui generis system. Many developing countries, however, feel that a
sui generis system, as proposed by TRIPS, is very similar to a patent
system and thus provides no distinct choice."
In addition to requiring relatively high standards of intellectual
13. See J.H. Reichman & David Lange, Bargaining Arond the TRIPS
Agreement: The Case for Ongohn Public-Private Initiativcs to Facilitate World1 ide
Intellectual Property Transactions, 9 DUKEJ. COMP. & IN'L L. 11, 20 (19U).
14. See id-
15. See Shukla, supra note 5.
16. For example, the Indian Patent Act excludes from patentability any method
of agriculture or horticulture and inventions that are frivolous or claim anything
obviously contrary to well-established natural laws. GRAIN, supra, note 8, at 92.
17. Article 27(3) TRIPS Agreement (italics added). OECD, supra note 2 at 69-
70.
18. One study concludes that the minimum requirements for a country's sti
generis system to comply with TRIPS would be that it: 1) provide for an intellectual
property right; 2) provide the same advantages to non-nationals as nationals: 3)
provide the same advantages to all NTO-member trading partners (MFN); 4) cover
plant varieties of all species- 5) permit actions against infringement; 6) be more than a
registration of a trademark/name; 7) be more than a geographical denomination; and
8) provide more than protection against unfair competition. However, this question
will not be resolved until the 1999 TRIPS review of Article 27(3)(b) to b, held in
Seattle this fall. See GRAIN, supra note 8, at 12. UNCTAD, supra note 10, at 63.
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property protection, TRIPS triggers the application of various dispute
resolution mechanisms when its provisions are violated by WTO
member states. 9  TRIPS benefits from strengthened dispute
resolution procedures because it falls under the auspices of the WTO.
Prior to the creation of the WTO, a panel decision was not binding
unless it was agreed to by all member states. The Dispute Settlement
Body (DSB) now provides that all decisions are automatically binding
unless there is consensus among the member states to block the
decision.'0 A member state's failure to abide by a DSB decision can
be enforced by sanctions in the form of a withdrawal of trading
concessions.' The high stakes implicit in this unprecedented linkage
between trade and intellectual property has placed great pressure on
India and other developing countries.
B. The Biodiversity Convention
Prior to the convening of the international community for the
URAs, a series of meetings were held in 1992 to address the
international concern regarding the accelerating depletion of the
world's biodiversity. The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)
emerged from these meetings, to which India and 170-odd countries,
not including the United States, became a party.' What is significant
about the CBD from a global standpoint is that it recognizes that
most of the research related to genetic resources originates in the
existing traditional knowledge of indigenous and local communities.
In fact, one study has shown that by consulting indigenous peoples,
bio-prospectors can increase the success ratio in trials from one in
10,000 samples to one in two.' Thus, innovators regarded the CBD
as an opportunity to help establish conditions that make the
commercialization of genetic materials possible. They sought to
include assurances within the CBD that they would be able to recoup
the costs and risks of developing a biotechnological invention based
19. See Robert J. Gutowski, Note, The Marriage of Intellectual Property and
International Trade in the TRIPS Agreement: Strange Bedfellows or a Match Made in
Heaven?, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 713,737-38 (1999).
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. The United States refuses to sign the CBD because of the outstanding
unresolved issues of IPRs. THE CRUCIBLE GROUP, PEOPLE, PLANTS AND PATENTS:
THE IMPACT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ON BIODIVERSITY, CONSERVATION,
TRADE, AND RURAL SOCIETY 35 (1994).
23. R.V. Anuradha, In Search of Knowledge and Resources: Who Sows? Who
Reaps? 6 REv. EURO. COMMUNITY & INT'L ENVT'L. L. 263,263 (1997).
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on a genetic resource.'4 Resource holders regarded the CBD as a
vehicle through which they could safeguard their own resources as
well as reap assurances that the contribution of their knowledge
regarding such resources would be adequately valued."' With these
interests in mind, three principal objectives for the CBD were framed
in Article 1: in sit26 conservation of biodiversity, sustainable use of
biological resources, and equitable sharing of benefits arising out of
such use.V
In particular, three articles of the CBD are the locus of
importance in the ongoing debate over the protection of genetic
resources. Article 15 focuses on the rights of the state, evidently
assuming that the various stakeholders in a given society work
together as one unit.' However, this is often a false assumption as
will be shown, infra, in the Kani Case Study. Article 15 is essentially
concerned with the movement of genetic resources across territorial
limits of states. In addition to subjecting access to genetic resources
to the national legislation of governments, such access is also subject
to the 'prior informed consent' of the contracting party providing
such resources, must be granted on 'mutually agreed terms', and
requires 'benefit sharing'.
Article 8(j), on the other hand, recognizes that a state cannot
have unitary control over its resources; it provides for the concerns of
local and indigenous communities:" Included are requirements for
the state to identify and document the knowledge, innovations, and
practices (KIPs) of such communities in an effort to determine what
constitutes conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity.
24. UNCTAD, supra note 10, at 16.
25. See id
26. In situ means "on-site" and involves conserving ecosystems, natural habitats.
and populations of species in their natural surroundings. In contrast, ex situ refers to
conservation of genetic resources outside of their natural habitats. One problem of
the CBD which has been cited is that the unique role of agricultural biodiversity has
not been fully understood. This is because the Convention provides for an exclusion
of genebank and botanic-garden material. i.e. ex situ material, collected before the
coming into force of the CBD. See generally Session 1: Farmers' Rights and Plant
Genetic Resources, Recognition & Reward: A Dialogue (M.S. Svaminathan ed.,
1995) [hereinafter Swaminathan].
27. See Utkarsh Ghate, Draft Indian Bio-diversity Act-l 49S
<http:/vwww.ecoindia.comlaugust2.htm> (on file wvith Hastings International and
Comparative Law Review).
28. See OECD, supra note 2, at 65.
29. See generally Swaminathan, supra note 27.
30. See GRAIN, supra note 8, at 44-45.
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States are also required to seek the approval and involvement of
communities when promoting the wider application of KIPs. Finally,
Article 8(j) calls for an equitable sharing of benefits that rise from the
utilization of KIPs between the state and local and indigenous
communities.31
Although there is no formal linkage between the CBD and
TRIPS, in fact, the strengths of the CBD expose the weaknesses in
TRIPS; that is, the CBD acknowledges that biological diversity
resources are the sovereign property of the country of origin and that
equitable sharing must involve sharing with indigenous communities
for their contribution and knowledge with regards to these resources.
Despite this deference to state sovereignty regarding t&',e protection
of local resource knowledge, the CBD does recognize the need to
honor intellectual property rights. The CBD, in Article 16.5,
mandates "adequate and effective" protection of intellectual property
rights for the transfer of biotechnology.32 Yet, these IPR laws must be
"supportive and not run counter to the objectives" of the CBD."
Needless to say, this Article remains a highly contentious point in the
global community.
The CBD is only enforceable if countries follow up with their
own domestic "access" legislation.Y Although there is a body of
experience with contractual arrangements that meet the specifications
of the CBD, many of these arrangements are still created on a case-
by-case basis. A framework of true rights and obligations of the
parties under the CBD still needs to be spelled oul. Especially
important are considerations of the enforceability of CBD provisions
against third parties and a common disparity of bargaining power
between the parties.35
31. See id.
32. See id. at 18.
33. Id.
34. Indeed, many countries are developing national legislation which implements
the CBD and includes rules on jurisdiction, bio-prospecting contracts, prior informed
consent, and export controls. Case law, such as the landmark case Moore v. Regents
of the University of California, 51 Cal. 3d 120 (1990), is also contibuting to the
development of law in this field. See Thomas Cottier, The Protection of Genetic
Resources and Traditional Knowledge: Towards More Specific Rights and Obligations
in World Trade Law, J. INT'L ECON. L. 555, 567-68 (1998).
35. See id. at 566. In addition to these Articles are provisions for technology
transfer, the facilitation of the exchange of information, and compatibility with
international laws. See OECD, supra note 2, at 65-67.
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1999] Defining the Scope of Intellectual Property Protection in India 7S5
C. Are TRIPS and the CBD at Odds?
The language of the CBD seems to rectify the gaps in the
language of TRIPS in providing for the rights of local and indigenous
communities. However, important to an analysis of the language of
the CBD is the fact that states still determine the scope of these local
and indigenous rights under an "as far as possible and appropriate"
standard, thereby giving states quite a bit of discretion." Despite this
seeming "creative license" afforded to states to experiment w ith
implementation of the CBD, the reconciliation of Article 16(5) with
TRIPS presents a formidable barrier. Article 16(5) highlights a
tension between the agreements by calling on parties to cooperate,
"subject to national and international law, to ensure that" intellectual
property rights are supportive of and do not run counter to the
objectives of the CBD' Other tensions between the agreements
include that: (1) Article 29 of TRIPS does not specify any conditions
on patent applications that the origin of the biological resource or
knowledge used in the biological invention be stated and (2) TRIPS
does not require that the prior informed consent of the
country/community be obtained by any inventor of biological
materials. '
Rethinking the primary objectives of these two international
agreements, one could argue that their reconciliation only emerges at
the expense of local and indigenous community rights. After all,
TRIPS was intended to grant private property rights as a form of
reward to inventors and incentive to innovate for would-be inventors.
The CBD primarily seeks to ensure conservation through the
prevention of the depletion of biodiversity resources. Rather than
being seen as an end in itself, the consent and support of local and
indigenous communities may be seen only as the most effective
means to an end of conservation. Given these disparate objectives,
one possible link between the agreements has been noted:
biodiversity resources would be best conserved through an adequate
valuation of these resources in the form of intellectual property
protection' Noted Indian environmentalists also point out that
36. See GRAIN, supra note 8. at 17-18.
37. Many developed countries have expressed their viewvs that the provisions of
Article 16 are complementary despite contrary views of other parties. See
UNCTAD, supra note 10, at 17.
38. See .
39. But perhaps this argument, at its core, suggests that actually making plant
breeding more lucrative will somehow prevent the loss of genetic diversity in nature.
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TRIPS, basing IPRs on full public disclosure of what is sought to be
protected, when coupled with provisions of the CBD, opens up
possibilities of reform of the IPR regime in favor of broader public
interests, including the interests of local and indigenous
communities.' Unfortunately, forums for both the CBD and TRIPS
turned down India's request for IPR disclosures about prior public
knowledge and source of material.4 Of course, this discussion
assumes that intellectual property rights are required by Article 16(5)
of the CBD. Part 1[ examines the existing alternatives under the
CBD and TRIPS agreements.
H. Responses to TRIPS and the CBD: To Patent or Not to
Patent
In response to this legislative and political quandary, India
actually has a number of choices at its disposal. This section seeks to
explore the advantages and disadvantages of each of these options
with an eye towards reconciling the different obligations laid out in
TRIPS and the CBD.
A. Silence
In defiance of the disparity in bargaining power between the
developed and developing countries in negotiating TRIPS, India
could choose to abstain from action. Indeed, the Patents Act of 1970
continues to serve as India's legislation on the scope of patent
protection. Although a presidential decree was promulgated in
December 1994 to implement provisions of TRIPS, the Parliament's
failure to ratify the decree in a timely fashion effectively created
inaction on the part of the Indian government.4" However, disparities
notwithstanding, the real politik that has since emerged insists that
India conform its laws to the standards of TRIPS if it wants to
continue playing as a global trading power. In 1997, the WTO
Appellate Body, acting upon a complaint filed by the United States,
issued a decision that reflected a critical step in affirming the WTO's
see id. at 69.
40. Every patent application has to be accompanied by a specification which
discloses the details of the process or product involved in sufficient depth so that any
other person skilled in the art can reproduce it. Gadgil & Rao, supra note 7.
41. See id.
42. See Jerome H. Reichman, Securing Compliance with the TRIPS Agreement
after US v. India, J. INT'L ECON. L. 585, 594 (1998).
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commitment to pushing forward the strict harmonization of IPR
standards on a global level* Professor Reichman has commented
that this decision effectively stopped the "diplomatic shilly-shalling
in which the government of India had indulged".' Thus, inaction
seems not to be a viable option.
B. Patent Protection
To understand the recurrent political stalemate in India, one
must probe into the genuine and perceived concerns of the public
with respect to patents. Consensus, on both sides, abounds on the
premise that there is a correlation between the economic, technical,
and industrial development of a country and the patent protection
afforded by that country. It is the nature of that correlation that is in
dispute.
1. Pro-Patent Arguments
Supporters of patents over plant genetic resources see this form
of protection as both a human right and a social necessity.' They
embrace many of the arguments offered for the reform of Indian
patent laws generally. First, many Western countries assert a human
right to IPRs, as embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and various pieces of national legislation. ' Second, many
supporters of patents view the prevention of free-riding on the
inventions of others as an incentive to promote innovation.'
43. See id.
44. See iL
45. See Gutowski, supra note 20. at 746.
46. Article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHRI protects
the right to the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary. or
artistic production. Article I Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution similarly protects
innovation "by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusi e right
to their respective writings and discoveries." Also, the Preamble to the In entors Act
of Venice of 1474 has a provision recognizing the philosophical foundation for the
protection of IPRs. However, others claim that IPRs cannot rise to the level of being
a human right as they are limited in duration. See Gutowski, supra note 20, at 746.
47. It is argued that since patents are territorial, some countries decide to allow
other countries to pay the costs of the development of new innovations, particularly
drugs in the Indian case. Meanwhile, the former countries import the products of the
latter countries, mimic the process by which these products are made for substantially
less cost, and stifle competition by selling these drugs for a reduced price. By
awarding patents, it is argued, India will be reaffirming its ideological support to the
system of incentives and rewards to investors. See M.D. Nair, Intellectual Property
Rights and the Indian Pharmaceutical Indust y, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. RTs. (144u7).
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Supporters also argue that patent protection will result in the
promotion of research and development (R & D) which will thereby
result in products of better quality. In particular, many scientists
argue that the level of R&D in the pharmaceutical industry is
abysmal and that due to free riding, the innovative component that
should be the hallmark of any new product is missing in Indian
products.'
Another argument made in favor of patents is India's need to
usher in foreign investment to the country and promote technology
transfer. Given that the level of R & D in India is suboptimal, if the
interests of foreign innovators are not adequately protected through
IPRs, they will resist entrance into the Indian market.4 Those
making these arguments also assert that India actively chose to
accede to TRIPS and to select this course-another indicator that
there is a global movement towards free trade and market
economies!"
Even those who recognize TRIPS as an imposition of an unfair
regime upon India agree that it is best to work within the constraints
of the prevalent regime to promote Indian interests. Such plant
patents are obtainable in the United States, Japan, Australia, and
some other countries, excluding European countries.' For practical
market reasons, private enterprise would obviously prefer patents to
other systems. Effective conservation, it is also argued, will require a
long-term redistributive strategy for the economic development of
India. Without patents, only contractual arrangements with
corporations will be permitted to allow India to exploit its own
resources financially. Given that raw genetic material has
"indeterminate usefulness," it will be difficult to value the material at
the moment the contract is sealed. 2 Also, given the greater
bargaining power of corporations, there might be an incentive to
48. See generally Martin Adelman & Sonia Baldia, Prospects and Limits of the
Patent Provision in the TRIPS Agreement: The Case of India. 29 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L. L. 507,525-28 (1996).
49. For example, in a recent World Bank study, 81% of U.S. research-based
pharmaceutical companies complained that because Indian intellectual property
protection is so weak, none of them would permit licensing of their technology nor
invest in R & D. Trade and Development Centre, India Country Study-Part 5: New
Drug Patents. (visited March 10, 2000) <http://wwv.itd.org/issues/indiC5.htm>.
50. See Gutowski, supra note 20, at 754.
51. See UNCTAD, supra note 10, at 20.
52. See Shayana Kadilal, Plants, Poverty, and Pharmaceutical Paents, 103 YALE
L.J. 232 (1993).
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undervalue the material. A patent thus allows the holder to corner
the benefits of increasing value over time.l
2. Anti-Patent Arguments
For many developing countries, a patent system simply does not
work. This standard of protection severely discounts the contribution
of local communities and farmers to the development of such
resources. As one leading Indian ecologist and activist states,
"[o]wnership and property claims are made on living resources, but
prior custody and use of those resources by farmers is not the
measure against which the patent is set. Rather, it is the intervention
of technology that determines the claim to their exclusive use."'
Indeed, farmers in India have clearly been opposed to TRIPS since its
inception. They fear that broader patent protection will raise the
price of seeds and make them dependent on varieties developed by
corporations rather than alloing them to save and share seeds
among themselves.55 Although Article 27.2 allows WTO members the
ability to exclude inventions "necessary to protect ordre public or
morality, including to protect human, animal, or plant life or health or
to avoid serious prejudice to the environment," this provision cannot
serve as a categorical exception for all genetic resources."' Indeed,
the latter part of 27.2 states that this exclusion may not be permitted
merely "because the exploitation is prohibited by ... law."" Thus,
without recourse, many developing countries have modified their
patent laws to meet the requirements of TRIPS for fear of violating
this agreement and having to shoulder the consequences.
Another fear is that the granting of exclusive marketing rights
will, in fact, negate any beneficial effects of increased foreign
investment.5 The UN Conference on Trade and Development
53. See id
54. VANDANA SHIvA, BIOPIRACy: THE PLUNDER OF NATU1RE AND KNOuWLEDtnE
51 (1997).
55. For a more extensive discussion on the issue of farmers' opposition to patent
protection, see Swarninathan, supra note 27, at 1-111.
56. UNCTAD, supra note 10, at 69.
57. Id.
58. See Shukla, supra note 5; SHIVA, supra note 55. Briefly, the last argument
mentioned concerns choosing between the granting of EMRs and product patents.
India has chosen to grant EMRs, which allows India a 10-year period of transition
before it must adopt a product patent regime. The second option, granting product
patents, requires the introduction of the product patents regime by the year 240.
The fallout of the route India has chosen to take is that applications coming in for
1999]
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conducted a study in which it concluded that although TRIPS is likely
to engender positive impacts on developing countries in regards to
technology transfer and local innovation, TRIPS could also
precipitate negative impacts, including higher prices and lack of
diffusion of products, in countries with the least developed industrial
and technological bases. 9
Aside from the foregoing concerns, many people feel that India
is not yet at a stage in its economic and technological development
that it can entertain extensive patent protection. One author
emphasizes that whereas developed countries have debated issues
related to the protection of plant genetic resources for d'ecades, most
developing countries have not had an equivalent debate." Despite
this fact, these countries are now required to legislate for the
protection of these resources without a clear notion of how to protect
local interests from international, and often even national, interests."
Professor Reichman feels that developing countries should create
legislation that reflects an aspiration to achieve the maximum level of
competition within their domestic markets that is also consistent with
a good faith implementation of the minimum standards of TRIPS"2
EMRs will not be examined until the year 2005, effectively granting an unconditional
patent-ike monopoly to anyone applying for a product patent. Only two conditions
need to be met to obtain an EMR: (1) that a patent has been granted in any WTO
member country and (2) that marketing approval be obtained in that other country.
See Biswajit Dhar, Complying with TRIPS Commitment: EMR versus Product Patent
Regime, ECON. & POL. WEEKLY, December 19, 1998 at 3230-31. Already, an
estimated 3,000 applications for EMRs have been filed in the mailbox. See also R.
Ramachandran, Disquiet Over a New Regime, FRONTLINE, December 19, 1998
(January 01, 1999) <http://www.the-hindu.com/fiine/fl1526/15260900.htm>.
59. UNCTAD, supra note 10.
60. Dr. Margaret LIewelyn., Patenting or Plant Variety Protectio,,? (unpublished
manuscript)(on file with Hastings International and Comparative Law Review).
61. See id. Dr. Llewelyn makes an interesting observation that opposition to
patents exists even in the United States and Europe. In the United States, an appeal
is being heard against the granting of a patent on a transgenic plant variety on the
basis that it should be protected under an alternative form of plant protection.
Pioneer Hi-Bred v. Farm Advantage, 33 F. Supp. 2d 794 (N.D. Iowa 1999). In
Europe, the controversy continues over the draft EU directive on the Legal
Protection of Biotechnological Inventions. As soon as the European Parliament
adopted the draft directive, it was challenged at the European Court of Justice.
62. See Reichman, supra note 43, at 597. Each country has to perform its own
cost-benefit analysis. On the gains side of the equation, Profe;sor Reichman
emphasizes the need for countries to consider the value of increased domestic
competition and better priced products as a result of stronger protection. On the loss
side of the equation, countries must consider the lost foreign investment that will
result from weaker protection. See id. at 588.
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Such an analysis should balance the cumulative gains to be had from
patent protection against the cumulative losses from a lack of patent
protection. However, accepting Professor Llewelyn's statement that
developing countries have not had adequate time to create these
equations for themselves, perhaps the time deadlines within which
TRIPS requires conformity are arbitrary.
Finally, many oppose patent protection on the basis of ethical
concerns: life forms and life processes should not be granted
monopolies of ownership.' They believe that plant genetic resources
should be in the public domain.' Patents, they claim, are meant to
protect the innovation of information. Rather than constitute new
information, plant genetic resources constitute existing knowledge.
Thus, these resources do not meet the level of innovation required for
patents under TRIPS. This form of "illegitimate" patenting of
genetic resources is pejoratively referred to as "biopiracy", defined by
one leading Indian ecologist and activist, Dr. Vandana Shiva, as "a
silent takeover of biological resources either by exploiting-whether
deliberately or unknowingly-or by directly smuggling out and
patenting of plants or seeds.""
Instead, Dr. Shiva and others have proposed the establishment of
a sui generis regime outside the IPR framework which would,
effectively, create "community intellectual rights"(CIPRs) which
distributes rights to communities without bringing their resources into
the pressures of a market economy.' These fights would be based on
the stewardship of local innovations by local communities, the free
exchange of knowledge among communities, and the obligation to
pay a royalty upon a commercial utilization of such knowledge:" In
fact, Dr. Shiva has suggested that the establishment of community
intellectual rights, which effectively grant communities the fight to
decide their own course of action, is the only solution to safeguard the
interests of communities and prevent genetic erosion. However,
63. See, e.g., Swaminathan, supra note 27.
64. See id.
65. "There can be biopiracy of knowledge of how to use biodiversity, or there can
be biopiracy of this biodiversityy itself." Shefali Rekhi, et al., Return of the Colonists,
INDIA TODAY (March 23, 1998) <http'iwww.india-
today.comlitoday/23031998/biz.htmk>.
66. According to Singh, Dr. Shiva believes that restrictions on global monopolies
and measures to prevent bio-piracy should be built into an amended TRIPS. See
Singh, supra note 1.
67. See UNCTAD, supra note 10, at 65.
68. See generally SHIWA, supra note 55.
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given that the traditional IPR system has rewarded individual
innovators, making CIPRs a tangible option has proven to be a
difficult task. Rather, many countries are implementing community
rights outside formal legal frameworks, such as by setting up
community registers of biodiversity as a means of establishing prior
art and thwarting efforts to privatize local genetic materials or
knowledge by persons outside the community.69
These anti-patent arguments, however, have lost appeal as an
increasing number of people realize that despite the inequality of
bargaining power inherent in TRIPS, there is an imperative need for
India to accept its obligations under TRIPS in order to profit from the
trade benefits promised through GAIT.0 New legal incentives have
become indispensable to further the cause of both firms and
developing countries. Firms in developed countries seek protection
of their innovations in order to create fair conditions of competition
among competing firms. Developing countries want to encourage
foreign investment in underdeveloped sectors, such as research and
development. Furthermore, much of the ethical resistance to patents
is based on widespread misperceptions that patents cart be claimed
over nature." In fact, Article 27(1) of TRIPS requires that only those
69. Professor Anil K. Gupta discusses another extralegal approach within which
several grassroots innovators are filing national patents in India. The Society for
Research and Initiatives for Sustainable Technologies and Institutions (SRISTI) has
set up an internal fund to honor ten to fifteen innovators every y.ar. The fund's
resources are generated from the license fee charged to companies using "public
domain" traditional knowledge. A Honey Bee network has also been established to
"pool ... the solutions developed by people across the world." Anil K. Gupta,
Securing Traditional Knowledge and Contemporary Innovations: Can Global Trade
Links Hold Grassroots Innovations? Honey Bee Perspective, (Aug. 1999)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with Hastings International and Comparative Law
Review).
70. Other arguments against patents also exist. For some, it is a practical concern
that granting patents over such materials will necessitate a strong judicial
enforcement system in order to protect these patents; many countries, including
India, lack this type of enforcement apparatus. Finally, others express concern that
patents on plant genes might be complicated because it is sometimes impossible to
control the flow of genes between plant populations. Suppose, for instance, that a
patented gene is inserted into a plant. Could someone be able to breed a new variety
of that plant, or would that be an infringement on the patent of the inserted gene?
This latter fear pertains to genetically modified organisms in which the genetic
information embodied in a plant is patented. These issues have be.n taken to the
international community to be addressed through a new agreement called the
Biosafety Protocol. See generally Swaminathan, supra note 27. See also UNCTAD,
supra note 10, at 56.
71. Trade & Development Centre, India Country Study Part 6: Local species-
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inventions that are "new, involve an innovative step, and are capable
of industrial application" be eligible for patents."
Even accounting for India's economic interests, however, patents
may not be the best solution. The concept of IPRs may work on a
theoretical basis; however, local and indigenous interests need more
protection and applications for patents need more description of the
source of the genetic resources. Also, while inventions must meet the
"innovative" standard, applying this standard to plant genetic
resources is often difficult in practice.' Since TRIPS permits for
either patents or "a sui generis system", what qualifies as an effective
sui generis system will next be explored.
C. Other Sui Generis Candidates
1. Plant Breeders' Rights (PBRs)
Special national laws of plant breeders' rights (PBRs) (also
called plant variety rights) were established in the 1960s because the
patent law in most countries was considered unsuitable for protecting
new plant varieties developed by traditional breeding methods." This
body of law seeks to protect the plant varieties created by plant
breeders to provide incentives for innovation without the strict legal
repercussions involved with the infringement of a patent. Plant
breeders can be anyone from a single farmer who has a new plant
variety to a private institution engaged in breeding research. '
Though patents and PBRs share some features in common, they
present some important differences. First, whereas for traditional
patents the standards are that the new product or process must be
novel, involve an inventive or non-obvious step, and have utility or
have industrial application, the standards for plant varieties are that
the new variety be distinct from known varieties, uniform, and stable.-
The rationale for this different standard still rests in the desire to
stimulate commercial plant breeding by providing protection to plant
turmeriq neem, and basnati (visited March 11. 21UU. i
<http://www.itd.orgLssuesfmdia6.htm>.
72. OECD, supra note 2, at 69.
73. See Llewelyn, supra note 61.
74. See UNCTAD, supra note 10, at 21.
75. See id
76. See Plant Variety Recognition and Rights: A Model Act art. 13 )( A. in
Swaminathan, supra note 27, at 404.
77. UNCrAD, supra note 10, at 19.
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breeders. A second difference between these types of protection is
the extent to which they protect plant genetic resources. Patents may
allow for the protection of particular genes embodied within an
individual plant. However, PBRs only protect plant varieties, which
are determined by a specific combination of genes. Also, PBRs allow
a protected variety to be used to create a new variety (known as a
"breeders exemption") and allow farmers to reuse seeds without any
adverse repercussion (known as "farmers' privilege").7
Because PBRs were conceived of to lessen the effects of the rigid
legal framework of patents on traditional plant breeders, the impact
of a PBR regime differs from a patent regime. For example, the main
beneficiaries of a PBR regime would be commercial plant breeders
that employ conventional breeding techniques and farmers that
develop and sell their own varieties." In contrast, the main
beneficiaries of a patents regime would be institutions and companies
specializing in genetic engineering techniques."' The latter bodies
would be receiving more legal protection under a patents regime and
therefore, more likely to invest in plant genetic resources.
a. UPOV Option
Created in 1961, the International Union for the Protection of
New Varieties of Plants (UPOV) administers the use of treaties to
establish basic rules for plant breeders' rights. The current UPOV
treaty in force is that of the 1978 Act, although it was amended in
1991.81
In the 1978 treaty, both the breeders' exemption and farmers'
privilege mentioned above are included.' Yet, the 1991 treaty
78. PBRs restrict the scope of the breeder's right to the commercial marketing of
the protected variety. This allows farmers, who sow the seeds of a protected plant
variety, to legitimately save part of their seed from prior crops to produce subsequent
crops. The practice of saving seeds is very high in developing countries, often rising
above 80% for self-pollinated crops and crops primarily grown for mtzbsistence. See
Carlos M. Correa, Elements for the Protection of Farmers' Plant Varieties (Aug.
1999) (unpublished manuscript, presented at World Trade Forum, Bern)(on file with
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review).
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. The 1991 Convention has not yet entered into force. The ratification of five
countries is needed, two of which must be new members to the Convention.
However, countries have the option to voluntarily implement provisions of the 1991
Convention and many have elected to do so. See GRAIN, supra note 8, at 15.
82. See id. at 16.
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restricts these provisions.' The 1991 treaty does not include the
farmer's privilege in its text, although industrial countries may
introduce it or maintain it in their national legislation. The 1991
treaty makes it more difficult for traditional plant breeders to
continue breeding plants."  Finally, the 1991 treaty allows for the
same resource to be doubly protected: by patents and by plant variety
protection!' Thus, the 1991 treaty undermines the interests of
farmers and local communities more than the 1978 treaty.
Many developing countries have adopted the UPOV because of
a perception that it is the only internationally accepted approach to a
sui generis method of protection of plant varieties." Yet many
developing countries assert that the UPOV, essentially a copy of the
European Plant Varieties Act, fails to serve the interests of their
farmers." The UPOV fails to give adequate attention to the fact that
where the material for a new variety comes from farmers, the
farmers' varieties are bound to be less uniform and stable than the
breeders' varieties. With this in mind, the "uniformity" requirement
of a plant variety protection could be made less stringent for
breeders, in favor of, perhaps, an "identifiable" requirement." '
Another recommendation has been made that geographical
appellations should be used. As the production of champagne is
restricted to producers in France, so should the production of basmati
rice be restricted to producers in north India and Pakistan."" Indeed,
despite these important lacunae in the UPOV treaties, the Indian
Ministry of Agriculture has drafted a Plant Varieties Protection and
83. See i.
84. See id.
85. The 1991 treaty extends the scope of the PBRs to include varieties
"essentially derived" from the protected variety. This standard makes it difficult to
freely breed without substantial changes to protected plant genetic resources.
Perhaps a payment of royalties to the owner of the initial protected variety may also
be required. See id
86. In contrast, the 1978 treaty specified plant variety protection as the only IPR
option for plant varieties. It explicitly prohibited double protection. See id.
87. See id.
88. A few studies have been performed on the impact of PBRs in the United
States and in developing countries. Unsettling conclusions have been reached. For
example, PBRs more distinctly pronounced the division between hy brid plant
varieties and self-pollinated plant varieties. What this means is that the seed industry
could change in the long run towards a more hybrid-driven market. This could
potentially hurt the interests of local farmers. See id. at 29-30.
89. UNCTAD, supra note 10, at 64.
90. See Rekhi et al., supra note 66.
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Farmers' Rights Act which is modeled on the UPOV 1991 treaty and
which essentially has eliminated all farmers' rights except for
acknowledging that farmers are often also breeders."
2. Farmers' Rights Options
Another option for governments is to accede to the FAO
International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources, an agreement
established in 1983 which touches on issues of agricultural
biodiversity and farming communities.' Although it is. currently a
non-binding agreement on member countries, it may become a
binding protocol to the CBD.' It has started to set the conditions for
access and benefit-sharing as well as for farmers' rights. Such rights
guarantee farmers returns on genetic material or local knowledge that
is shared with any scientists or companies, national or foreign.'
Often, this set of Farmers' Rights is viewed as being in conflicting
terms with PBRs because of the wide degree of farmers' control
sought over genetic materials, local knowledge, financial resources,
capacity building, and markets.
Nevertheless, one proposal emerged at a meeting held in
Madras, India, in 1994, in which the Indian government expressed a
possibility of legislating a dual system of rights.95 Interestingly, the
Madras proposal mentioned above proposes to safcguard both
farmers' rights and plant breeders' rights, effectively requiring either
a taxation system on seed industry profits or a voluntary surrender of
national seed companies' royalty returns to farm and community
organizations.96 If brought into law, this would be the first time that
any country has legally acknowledged farmers' rights.'
Yet, a regime of farmers' rights would alone prove to be
inadequate. Indeed, although such a regime might recognize the
imperative to compensate farmers' for their knowledge, it does not
fully address the role of the state in preventing the misappropriation
of plant genetic resources." Furthermore, a regime of Farmers'
91. See UNCTAD, supra note 10, at 93.
92. See GRAIN, supra note 8, at 31.
93. See SHIVA, supra note 55, at 18.
94. See id.
95. See Swaminathan, supra note 27, at 34-35.
96. Participants of this meeting recommended that 5% of the gross income from
the sale of seeds of new varieties be returned to local innovators. See .
97. See id.
98. See Llewelyn, supra note 61.
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Rights might not qualify as an effective sui generis system under
TRIPS. Not only would it be difficult to determine who would hold
the Farmers' Right- one farmer, a community of farmers- but it would
also be difficult to justify protection over plant genetic resources if
the farmers had not made any modifications to their breeding
techniques. Thus, although the concept of Farmers' Rights may be
necessary to consider in drafting national legislation, it would have to
be supplemented by other legislation to account for all stakeholders.
3. Material Transfer Agreements (MTAs) Option
In recent years, as interest has increased in the use of genetic
material for potential commercial, as well as academic purposes, the
need for formal arrangements has been considered between the
donors of genetic material (the provider) and individuals and
organizations (the recipient) who request materials."' Furthermore,
these arrangements can be made whether or not intellectual property
rights are subsequently given. MTAs may be viewed as bilateral
contractual arrangements by which providers can receive the
proportionate benefit of their contribution to the material, in the
interim, before the generation of intellectual property by the
recipient.' These agreements are increasingly being utilized by
public sector laboratories and also now appear in international
genetic material exchanges, including those from developing to
industrialized countries.
The advantages to this approach are that the scope of the genetic
material in question can be detailed on a case-by-case basis. In
essence, an IVITA eases the impact of the TRIPS standards as Article
27 simply becomes a set of default rules to be bargained around in
each case. 2 The agreements can be drafted to require recognition of
the source country and/or local communities from which the genetic
material has come (in the case of international storage facilities-i.e.
genebanks).'" Also, these agreements can specify whether
intellectual property rights can generally be obtained on a particular
genetic material as a query separate from an agreement to use genetic
99. See id.
100. UNCTAD, supra note 10, at 25.
101. See id
102. Professors Lange and Reichman proffer that viewing the TRIPS agreement in
this way will help developing countries to regain "some of the negotiating initiative
that was lost during the URAs." Reiclunan & Lange, supra note 14, at 93.94.
103. See generally, UNCTAD, supra note 11.
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material in a particular instance.
An attractive option as it is, MTAs have several drawbacks.
First, although the concept of bilateral contracts is increasingly
becoming popular, the issue of enforcement against third parties not
privy to the contract remains unresolved.1" Second, an MTA alone
would not meet the requirements of an effective sui generis system;
although it provides for access to genetic resources, it does not
adequately address the issue of protection of these resources. "'
Finally, such bilateral contracts might be seen to infringe on the
sovereignty of local communities. For example, if an MTA exists
between India and the United States for the exchange of a particular
genetic resource, the role of the local community from which the
resource is taken still remains ambiguous."
D. Irreconcilable differences?
Therefore, although TRIPS and the CBD may superficially
appear to be at odds with each other, a further analysis offers the
possibility of reconciling the two agreements. The CBD does set
down the principle of sovereign rights over genetic resou:rces. TRIPS
does require protection of genetic resources through patents or an
effective sui generis system. If member states party to both
agreements are willing to allow private rights to be obtained over
these resources in exchange for an equitable share in potential
proceeds, they can meet their obligations under both agreements. '"7
This section has explored multiple approaches to this reconciliation;
the next section will explore the context of the debate in India.
104. Cottier, supra note 35, at 566.
105. Professor Cottier notes that currently the relationship between traditional
IPRs and the right of access to biotechnology and to revenues is left to private or
state contracts between bioprospecting firms and public authorities or private
research entities. A system of genuine rights and obligations is yet to be developed.
See id.
106. However, Professor Cottier has proffered a two-tiered propo.al: proceeds of
untouched and potential proceeds would appertain to the state and proceeds of
existing knowledge would appertain to the local community or individual. In the
latter scenario, the state would have no per se entitlement to the proceeds, except
when it acts as a private economic owner (e.g. a public research insti :ution) and not
as a political actor. See id. at 574. However, the ability for a local community or
individual to provide input into the negotiations for an MTA still remains unresolved.
107. Llewelyn, supra note 62.
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LI.Realpolitiking in India
A. Patents Act From 1970 to 1999
Article 65 of TRIPS permits developing country members to
delay the implementation of product" patent protection for a
transitional period of ten years after the entry into force of TRIPS.""
However, Article 70 proceeds to state that if a country chooses this
option, it must still immediately conform its patent law in two
respects: first, it must create a mailbox mechanism"' to receive
applications for pharmaceutical and agricultural product patents:
second, it must grant exclusive marketing rights (EMRs)"' to foreign
patent holders who have applied for and obtained product patents
and marketing approval for such products in other WTO member
countries for a period of five years., The immediate implication for
India in 1995, the time of TRIPS' entry into force, was that its own
Patents Act of 1970 needed to be reformed with respect to these
issues. Yet, even as the Indian government tried to amend the 1970
Patents Act in 1995, the endeavor met its death in a bitter political
struggle in the Rajya Sabha (Upper Parliament).!" India had until
2000 to comply with other aspects of the TRIPS agreement such as
Article 27(3) and the protection of plant genetic resources: " Thus, as
108. Articles 70(8) and 70(9) of TRIPS. Shukla, supra note 5 at 312N. Process
patents only protect the process involved in making a product. On the other hand.
TRIPS requires product patents, which protect the actual product itself.
109. OECD, supra note 2, at 71.
110. A mailbox mechanism allows foreign applicants for product patents to
preserve the novelty and priority dates of their claims for pharmaceutical and
agricultural patents pending the grace transitional period allowed to least-developed
countries. Reichman, supra note 43, at 594.
111. See id.
112. Article 70(9). OECD, supra note 2, at 73.
113. The question of how much protection to afford pharmaceutical products has
plagued India for many years. Big pharmaceutical firms in India that are already
capable of profiting from the TRIPS standards of protection are at bitter odds with
the smaller firms. These smaller firms have successfully captured the generic drug
market and have resisted strong patent laws. Reichman & Lange, supra note 14, at
25. In fact, the Indian Drug Manufacturers Association have opposed India's
amendments to its Patent Law on the basis that the amendments have gone beyond
the requirements of TRIPS and are detrimental to its interests. One change the
IDMA would like is the permission to conduct research on drugs w&hile they are
patent protected. They argue that this stems from the Canadian model. Ho%%ever,
the Canadian model will most probably be soon struck down by the \VTO. See
INDiAN ExPREss, September 14,1999.
114. See Trade Development Centre, supra note 50.
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the year 2000 has arrived, India must decide how it will amend its
1970 Patents Act with respect to creating a mailbox mechanism,
granting EMRs, and whether or not to grant patents over plant
genetic resources under Article 27.3.
However, India has buckled underneath international pressure.
Upset that India had provided for neither a mailbox mechanism nor
exclusive marketing rights at the time TRIPS was entered into force,
the United States lodged a complaint with the DSB of the WTO."'
This inaction on the part of the Indian government evoked
international opprobrium. The DSB's Appellate body decision in US
v. India held for the United States."6 India was confronted by an
ultimatum: either amend the Patents Act of 1970 or accept possible
trade sanctions. India made a commitment to the United States that
it would survive the political struggle and successfully araend its Act
by April 15, 1999."7 Although the bill was passed through as a
Cabinet ordinance in January 1999 ', the United States expressed
115. First, the United States filed complaints with the WTO in 1996, alleging
failure on India's part to comply with articles 70(8) and 70(9) of TRIPS. Rishi Roop
Tripathi, The patent(s) paranoia, ECON. TIMES OF INDIA (November 23-29, 1998)
<http://www.economictimes.com/231198/23invgO2.htm>. Second, die European
Union (EU) filed a complaint in 1997, based upon the same allegatons as the US
complaint. Anjuli Bhargava, India loses dispute with European Union on patents
under WTO Agreement, BUSINESS STANDARD (August 31, 1998)
<http://www.business-standard.com/98aug31/economyl.htm>.
116. Reichman, supra note 43, at 594.
117. Rekhi, Menon & Menon, supra note 66.
118. Although the bill was introduced in the Rajya Sabha in November 1998 and
passed in December 1998, it is facing constitutional challenges from the coalition of
Left political parties which contend that it will undermine the economic sovereignty
of the country, federalism, separation of powers, and participatory democracy.
Federalism concerns reveal that agriculture and public health are state concerns and
the parties advocating this bill have not yet consulted state governments. DH News
Service, Patents Bill introduced in RS Amidst stiff opposition from Left, DECCAN
HERALD (November 17, 1998)
<http:/wwwv.deccanherald.com/deccanherald/dec17/natpat.htm>. The separation of
powers concern regards the political expediency through which the Executive is
attempting to influence Parliament into granting EMRs. "It is the case of the
executive serving the legislature with a fait accompli," Ramachandran, supra note 59.
Finally, because the government neglected to initiate public debate over the bill,
thereby undermining the notion of a participatory democracy, a People's
Commission on Intellectual Property Rights has been set up. See id.
Nevertheless, the Cabinet surged ahead in January 1999, promulgating an ordinance
to amend the Act by providing for the mailbox mechanism to accord EMRs. This
unilateral action by the executive branch sent a shock of fear to non-governmental
organizations, one of which has appealed to President Narayanan to hold back the
ordinance until it has enjoyed thorough debate in the Lok Sabha (Lower House of
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concern that the ordinance failed to meet the TRIPS standards."'
This time, however, the United States chose not to take any action
pending the resolution of the Indian elections: At present, the Indian
government seems to be moving towards action as an amended Act
again makes its way to the table of Parliament. However, seven new
pieces of legislation have all been introduced into Parliament, some
of which implicate India's position under both the CBD and TRIPS.'"
Substantial fear abounds that because all this legislation has been
hurriedly introduced into Parliament, the interests of all the players in
the patent debate have not been adequately considered. ' 2
Undoubtedly, the Indian government has expedited legislative action
for fear of further international opprobrium. Thus, political quagmire
has once again entrapped legislative action, and the clock on the
approaching WTO deadline continues to tick.
If the Indian government expends its political will to find points
of convergence between these seven pieces of legislation, it can still
Parliament). Shefali Mishra, India ignore WTO deadline on patents, IDI V. EXPRESS
(April 20,1999) <http:!lwww.expressindia.com/iefdailyv199 U420/ibu2Iti'.html>.
119. Mishra, supra note 119. U.S. objections to the patents ordinance relate to a
provision on compulsory licensing, under which India can widely license marketing
rights in the interests of public health and safety. Many developed countries,
including the United States, strongly dislike the adoption of a system of compulsory
licensing within a patents regime, or a related form of automatic licensing. Although
both approaches retain the ability of the inventor to collect royalties on the use of
their invention, national legislation would mandate that the inventor make her
invention adequately available to the public-at-large, a failure of which would result
in the distribution of licenses to exploit the invention to anyone willing to pay for a
license. Despite the fact that many developing countries have some such compulsory
licensing system in their national patent lav s, private industry is conc,!rned that such
a system fails to accord enough protection over an invention. Currently, India has
incorporated some 'license of right' language into its patent legislation. It is
questionable whether India should continue to safeguard the right of the public to
claim an invention if it is not worked in that society within a certain time period.
120. Gutowski, supra note 20, at 743.
121. Patents Bill referred to Panel, INDIAN EXPRESS (January 30. 2000)
<http:/wwv.expressindia.comiefdailv/20000130ibu30046.html>.
122. Major Left-wing organizations, including the Campaign Against Patent and
Insurance Bills, have urged the Indian government not to sign any agreement at the
forthcoming ministerial conference on the global review of the TRIPS agreement in
November without the approval of Parliament. Global Rcriett, of TRIPS pactr-Lgft
calls fior national debate on patents issue, BUSIEss LDNE (July 22, IY991
<http:/wvv.indiaserver.comfbline/1999072 3fstoriesI1423445j.htm>. Apparently,
the Research Foundation for Science, Technology, and Ecology, as plaintiff, is
challenging the constitutionality of the Patents Act on the basis that it works against
the national interest (in particular, with respect to food security and medicines and
drugs). See id.
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devise a somewhat comprehensive framework for the protection of
genetic resources and reconcile its obligations under international
law. Indeed, Professor Reichman proffers his view that the WTO, in
deciding US v. India, sent out an important message to developing
countries struggling to fulfill their obligations under TRIPS."3
Although the decision upheld the requirement that member countries
must conform their laws to TRIPS standards, Reichman's interprets
the decision to affirm that the WTO will defer to local law and strictly
construe treaties, not reading anything more than is slated in the
black letter language of the treaty itself. As long as member
countries abide by the express provisions of TRIPS, they have
substantial discretion to, in good faith, adopt a pro-competitive
approach to implementing the undefined provisions of the TRIPS
Agreement."4
Not only has the process of implementing provisions of TRIPS
and the CBD in India been excruciatingly slow, but it has also been
divided up piecemeal among various types of legislation and among
uncoordinated government ministries at the central level."'
Undoubtedly, because the pharmaceutical lobby enjoys a higher
profile than the biodiversity lobby, there is little incentive for
legislation to make the explicit linkages between TRIPS and the
CBD. Given that no single piece of current Indian legislation fully
covers all aspects of the interlinkages between biodiversity, access to
genetic resources, and intellectual property rights, the process
requires a complete restructuring of the existing legal structure in
some areas as well as the introduction of legislation in other areas
where there are current vacuums. Useful to a discussion of the
development of a comprehensive regime in India would be a quick
look at the current status of pieces of legislation, with a critical
analysis of gaps and potential incongruities between them.
B. Decentralization
As a federal democratic republic, India has recently instituted
the 73rd Amendment Act to its Constitution."' This amendment
furthers the role of decentralization in the country's governance by
123. Reichman, supra note 43, at 596-597.
124. See id.
125. Included in these ministries are the Ministry of Environment ard Forests, the
Ministry of Commerce, and the Ministry of Agriculture. Anuradha, supra note 24, at
267.
126. The Act was institutionalized in 1993. See id.
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devolving matters previously under the jurisdiction of the center to
local communities, as well as the Panchayats' Act 1996, which
empowers villages, especially tribal communities, to safeguard their
traditions, cultural identity, and communal resources." Although
these local bodies can only make recommendations to state bodies,
there exists some potential to develop local control over access to
resources and knowledge of the communities.
C. Draft Biological Diversity Act
Against this decentralized legal background has emerged Indian
draft legislation on biodiversity, known as the proposed Biological
Diversity Act, which would fulfill India's obligation under the CBD
to implement national legislation." The Bill has been introduced into
Parliament and awaits its tough political battle.: The proposed Act
aims to achieve the same three objectives as the CBD. In fact, the
Act aspires to provide for the integration of biodiversity protection
into government economic sector plans. Some of the salient features
of the draft include (1) the regulation of access to Indian genetic
material, by Indians and non-Indians alike, including the requirement
of benefit-sharing for all concerned parties and relaxed restrictions
for research ventures; (2) the provision for conservation measures,
including Biodiversity Heritage Sites- (3) empowerment of local
communities to enter into negotiations regarding the use of resources
and knowledge wvithin their jurisdiction"'; (4) the regulation of risks
associated with biotechnology, including genetically modified
127. Similar to the U.S. Constitution, the Indian Constitution emisages a
separation of powers between the central and state governments. Accordingly, a
schedule to the Constitution contains three lists which clearly demarcate the
legislative powers of the respective governments. For example, fisheries, agriculture.
land, rights in and over land, and land tenure are matters under State jurisdiction;
forests, wild animals, and birds are under the concurrent jurisdiction of central and
state governments. The 73'J Amendment, in effect, institutionalized a third structure
of government. Importantly, aspects of ecosystem management have b.-en placed
under local jurisdiction. Under the 1996 Act, local communities are endowed vith
ownership over minor forest produce as well as with the ability to prev ent alienation
of land. See id- at 268, 273.
128. Ashish Kothari, India's Biodiversity Act: Finally, A Step in th Rithe
Direction, BIO-IPR, December 1998.
129. See id.
130. The debate over the 1997 draft focused on the implementation of Article 3 on
sovereignty. This Article was concerned with the recognition of indigenous
knowledge and the distribution of power between the State and communities.
GRAiN, supra note 9, at 93.
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organisms; and (5) a redress mechanism which allows citizens to
approach the courts with violations of the Act.' However, probably
the most important aspect of the proposed legislation involves the
creation of bodies at national, state, and local levels to carry out the
functions of the Act as well as to house funds earmarked for these
functions. 2 Despite the positive action which has finally been taken
by the Indian government, whether this document truly covers all
situations and stakeholders remains questionable and will necessarily
affect its ability to become a viable piece of legislation. Also, the lack
of coordination, indeed often the overlap, between the CBD and
TRIPS requires that India, at this important crossroads, develop a
piece of national legislation which reconciles its primary obligations
under those international agreements.
Many questions and issues have been left unresolved in the draft
legislation. Some of these problematic gaps include:
Patents- what is the relationship between the Act and TRIPS?
There is no mention made in the language of the Act of changing the
IPR regime within TRIPS. If India opts for patent protection of
genetic resources, will the provisions applicable to patents on other
subject matters apply here? For example, will EMRs be given for
genetic resources? Or is India selecting a sui generis option under
TRIPS through the government's draft of the Plant Varieties Act? In
fact, the draft Biological Diversity Act is only one of the pieces of
legislation currently languishing in Parliament. Another piece of
legislation is the amended Patents Act, 1999. How these pieces of
legislation are going to work together also remains unresolved.
(la) A related question is what are the standards for patent
review?
(2) What are the true objectives of the Act- do they merely
reflect the objectives of the CBD or do they seek to include the
encouragement of cultural diversity and the need for lechnological
and social development? In other words, what are the true
motivations giving rise to this Act?
(3) What kinds of benefits will accrue to communities-transfer of
technology, participation in R&D, non-monetary awards? How will
beneficiaries be identified? What if more than one community holds
the same knowledge? How can a community be defined?
(4) What will consultations with local bodies look like? Will they
131. Ghate, supra note 28.
132. See id.
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be contracts? Do local bodies have the capacity and information to
consult effectively on their own?
(5) What type of protection will there be for knowledge? For
example, will folk knowledge be included? How will that knowledge
be ascertained?
(6) What is the jurisdiction of the Biodiversity Act? In other
words, what types of materials come within the ambit of protection?
What is to be done with Indian ex situ germplasm?
(7) A final issue is whether India can use this piece of legislation
to enforce its commitment to the Biosafet, Protocol, an international
mechanism to regulate the risks associated with biotechnology?
Several individuals have reflected on these plaguing issues and
have disagreed as to the solutions."3 The following answers partially
present a preference articulated by noted Indian lawyers and
environmentalists and partially present solutions and the author's
recommendations that emerge from reading different pieces of
legislation together.
(1) The bargaining power of India, in regards to global
biodiversity control, is argued to be weak relative to other developing
countries. This is because only between one-fourth and one-third of
the total organismic taxa found in India is exclusive to India." Also,
India enjoys no effective regional alliances because of poor
relationships with its neighbors and incessant transboundary issues.
Thus, it seems that India will have to afford a stronger form of
protection to genetic resource innovations than simply community
intellectual rights, for example, in order to maintain its role in the
international community.
(la) In looking at applications for patents or another form of
protection, examiners should be required to look at the novelty and
innovation of the claim and the extent of public domain knowledge
contained in the claim (including the information contained in village
level registers and national gene databases). Perhaps an additional
requirement should be made to solicit community approval when
examining a claim.'"
(2) The objectives of the Act need to be articulated as not only
133. See id.
134. Trade & Development Centre, supra note 50.
135. See i.
136. Ghate, supra note 28.
137. See i.
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mirroring those of the CBD, but also of attempting to reconcile
different objectives under the CBD and TRIPS, incorporating a sui
generis system which is compatible with the provisions of the Act, and
safeguarding the interests of the different stakeholders in the
protection and development of genetic resources. For those who
argue against all patents and sui generis forms of protection on life,
the Act need not conform to TRIPS. However, in order to avoid
global opprobrium, India would have had to push for a consensual
amendment to TRIPS at the ministerial meeting held in Seattle this
fall.'s
(3) Several options have been discussed for the distribution of
benefits. Direct benefits could include up-front payments by the
recipient of the genetic resource to the community provider for
collecting initial samples, milestone payments (when product
development and marketing become feasible), and a long-term
royalty.'39 A public gene fund could be set up to handle cases in which
the communities cannot be identified. In fact, the draft Plant Variety
and Farmers' Rights Act suggests the creation of a National
Community Gene Fund."' One option laid out in a meeting for
experts, but which has since been discarded in the draft Act, included
the levying of a tax on the seed industry. 4' Thus, five percent of the
gross income from the sale of seeds of a new plant variety would go to
either a community or a public gene fund. The Act should also
contemplate indirect benefits, including rewards to communities for
conservation of genetic resources, preservation of their folk
knowledge, and the encouragement of programs exchanging
knowledge and seeds. The Act should specify that any prospective
benefits should be publicized in local documents so as to provide
incentives to local communities to engage in these activities.
(4) Consultations should include MTAs between the Indian
government, recipients of the genetic resources, and a domestic
repository of genetic material (through which all transferred material
would need to go). It should be made mandatory to fully, disclose the
source and method of obtaining the genetic material. This duty
emanates from the provision of the CBD that requires prior informed
138. Llewelyn, supra note 61.
139. Ghate, supra note 28.
140. Cottier, supra note 35, at 568.
141. The Svaminathan Committee developed a model Plant Varieties Act.
Article 9 provides for a steady royalty to communities. Swaminathan. supra note 27,
at 412.
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consent."' Yet, the ability of local bodies to meaningfully participate
in consultations hinges on the level of transparency India is able to
achieve in regards to information."3
(5) It has been urged that the knowledge of the uses of genetic
resources needs to be documented as a first step to effective
protection of India's genetic diversity." Two southern states in India,
Karnataka and Kerala, have taken the lead in implementing
Community Biodiversity Registers which seek to document the
knowledge of occurrence, practices of propagation, sustainable
harvests and conservation, in addition to economic uses of
biodiversity resources residing in India's communities.' This
collection of information provides a mechanism by which to develop
the idea of benefit-sharing. The Karnataka State Planning Board has
provided for such registers to be prepared under the supervision of
the local bodies created under the 73rd Amendment, discussed above
in Part 1II(B). This information would play an important role in
negotiations with parties seeking transfer of biodiversity resources.
In Kerala, the five-year plan provides for substantial financial and
administrative resources to create and sustain a similar register.'
(6) The jurisdiction of the Act must cover wild and domesticated
species, both as occurring in the field and in domestic genebanks.
Thus, the Act must explicitly include agrobiodiversity and, at least,
include a reference to ex situ germplasm.'" However, because the
CBD excludes ex situ germplasm from its own jurisdiction, other
legislation- either multilateral or national- should be encouraged
to handle issues of India's genetic materials located abroad.
Although India has vast diversity and utilization of genetic resources,
most of its rice germplasm and information on medicinal uses of
Indian plants is located abroad.4
142. Trade & Development Centre, supra note 50.
143. Madhav Gadgil, a noted environmentalist, strongly advocates for a good
system of information collection and dissemination as the key to this Act's success.
He especially stresses transparency for the following issues: information contained in
patent and plant variety applications, information in MTAs on the origin of resources
and knowledge of uses of resources, information in classical texts on uses of
biodiversity resources, and information on oral tradition. See id.
144. Ghate, supra note 28.
145. Anuradha, supra note 24, at 269.
146. See id.
147. Ghate, supra note 28.
148. The database, Natural Products Alert, which is located in Chicago, has better
information on medicinal uses of Indian plants than any Indian database. Thus, this
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Theoretically, perhaps the foregoing analysis seems to
adequately reconcile the conflicting language of the CBD and TRIPS.
Yet, questions remain as to the applicability of such a proposed
National Biodiversity Act. The next section discusses a case study of
the Kani Tribe in Kerala and examines the posSibilities and
difficulties accompanying in implementing such legislation.
D. Kani Tribe Case Study
Arogyapacha: a rare herb with amazing medicinal properties." '
Enter the different players: (1) There is the Kani tribe of the southern
Indian state of Kerala, numbering at about 16,000 and living on forest
settlements of government land.15° They have preserved the plant and
the knowledge about its medicinal uses. (2) The Tropical Botanical
Garden Research Institute (TBGRI) is a government center for plant
research also located in Kerala."' It successfully isolated the plant's
medicinal properties and created a traditional drug formula
containing fifteen percent of the plant. (3) There is the Arya Vaida
Pharmacy (AVP), a private pharmacy in Kerala."2 TBGRI sold the
formula to AVP in 1995 for a license fee of Rs. 10 lakh"3 to produce
the drug for seven years."s The scientists made an informal
agreement with the Kanis to equally share the license fee and the two
percent royalty on the profits from the formulation. The drug,
named Jeevani, was sold at the rate of Rs. 160156 for a 75-gram jar."'
The growing demand for the drug has resulted in the Kanis' ability to
is yet another instance in which India should have great incentive to fully disclose its
ethnobotanical database within India. Foreigners already seem to know the
information, and if Indians themselves could be made aware of anc have access to
this information, Indians could enter into these debates armed. Trade &
Development Centre, supra note 50.
149. The name means 'health green' in Malayalam, Kerala's official language.
Max Martin, Wonder Herb of the Kanis, DOWN TO EARTH (CENTRE 1FOR SCIENCE &
ENVIRONMENT) (November 15, 1998)
<http:llwww.oneworld.orglcselhtml/dte/dte981115/dte_cover.htm>.
150. See id.
151. See id.
152- See id.
153. One lakh is the equivalent of 100,000 Indian rupees. One U.S. dollar is
approximately worth forty-two rupees. Thus, one lakh rupees equals about $2,400.
154. Martin, supra note 150.
155. See id.
156. Rs. 160 is approximately four U.S. dollars.
157. Martin, supra note 150.
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collect Rs. 100" per kilogram of the plant's leaves.' They grow the
plant in their backyards. (4) Then there is the Forest Department.""
Because this plant is not on the official government list of minor
forest produce, the plant cannot leave the forest. Although, in 1995,
the government's Integrated Tribal Development Project initiated a
scheme to help the Kanis grow these plants in their settlements in a
regulated way, officials of the Forest Department confiscated
thousands of these plants in 1996, allegedly to "prevent the
destructive use of the plant"Y" (5) There are also the officials of the
state-led Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPI-M).Y They claim
that TBGRI should have sold the formula to the state-owned drug
company, as opposed to AVP, a private drug company. Yet, it did
not take action to encourage the government pharmaceutical
company to come up with an alternate form of benefit-sharing. (6)
There is also the Indian Council of Scientific and Industrial Research
(CSIR), a national body, that has set norms allowving for technology
transfer to anyone who offers the largest return." At Rs.10 lakh, the
license fee extracted from AVP is the highest license fee in India.
Nevertheless, there has been cultivation with no production for the
last year.
But the story does not end there. (7) There is the Kerala
Institute for Research, Training, and Development of Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes which works with tribes, such as the
Kanis. '6 This government agency believes that traditional knowledge
is sacred and should remain exclusive to the Kanis, opting for a
program by which to train tribal healers. Officials of KIRTADS have
ideological differences with TBGRI's perceived market-friendly style
and both refuse to cooperate in finding a solution. (8) Finally, the
bitter feuding between difference government agencies has fractured
the Kani tribe between those tribe members who support
commercialization of Arogyapacha and those tribe members who do
not think this tribal medical knowledge should be transferred to the
private market. Currently, there are two movements clamoring for
recognition. One movement is led by a Kani group that staged a
158. Rs. 100 is approximately two and a half U.S. dollars.
159. Martin, supra note 150.
160. See id.
161. See id.
162- See iL
163. See id.
164. See id.
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press conference in July 1998 to pressure the state government to
allow the Kanis to grow, sell, and make profit from the plant.""
Indeed, representatives of the tribe have launched a Kani Community
Welfare Trust that has the representation of forty tribal settlements."A
These Kanis support the commercialization of the plant, provided
that their community adequately receives its share of the benefits
from such commercial ventures. In the other movement, KIRTADS
and other members of the Kani community, are advocaling, and have
been since 1995, draft legislation which gives exclusive fights to tribal
communities over their intellectual property.67 While they do not
support the commercialization of the plant, they do support gaining
exclusive rights to the plant through legislation. Termed the Kerala
Tribal Intellectual Property Rights Bill"', the draft envisages the
creation of a tribal IPRs council with judicial powers to prevent
exploitation and misuse of tribal IPRs 69 Infringement could lead to
four years' imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 500,000.171 However, there
are potential constitutional challenges to this bill because the issue of
intellectual property rights is an issue under the exclusive jurisdiction
of the national government 7
The first benefit-sharing experiment of its kind in the world has
floundered and suffered under the weight of its own deficiencies and
lack of national guidance." An issue begging analysis is how this
experiment could have been a viable agreement. Subjecting the Kani
experiment to the preceding analysis of the National Biodiversity Act
reveals both the deficiencies of this benefit-sharing agreement and
the possibilities for a better deal.
(1)First and foremost, this experiment illustrates te horrors of
no coordination. Many of the players were arms of the state and
national government and yet there was no coordination or even a
mechanism for dialogue between them. Only national legislation,
which clearly specifies the scope of duties and incentives for each
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. Draft of The Kerala Tribal Intellectual Property Rights Bill, 196.
168. See id. This Bill was drafted with the help of KIRTADS, K. Abdul Lathced
(former faculty member of the National Law School of India and joirt coordinator of
Kerala Environment and Human Rights Research Centre).
169. Chapter III. See id.
170. See id.
171. Martin, supra note 150.
172. See id.
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player, can effectively remedy this problem. This lack of coordination
also explodes the myth that government entities work together as one
unit. Rather, as demonstrated in this case study, intra-governmental
actors often have distinct interests that must be accounted for in
national and local legislation.
(2) Article 15 of the CBD specifies that the prior informed
consent of local communities must be granted in order for parties to
access genetic resources. In the Kani experiment, there was no prior
informed consent as TBGRI began the process of isolation on its
own. Although it shared the license fee and any resulting royalties on
the drug, the process was not one in which there were mutually
agreed terms. In terms of benefits, there was no up-front payment for
the initial collection of plants from the forest settlements." There
was also no discussion of the procurement of other benefits, such as
the Kanis' right to land tenure." A related issue is that of adequately
defining the community."5 Because of the internal fissure within the
Kani communities, some body representative of the Kani people
needs to be established. Perhaps the Kani Community Welfare Trust,
which has been set up and stands empty at present, is a good example
of such a body.
(3) The process by which the drug was created and sold did not
involve consultations with the Kanis; indeed, Kanis were not made a
party to the agreement that TBGRI entered into with AVP. "1 There
was no negotiation; instead, the goodvill of the scientists of TBGRI
assured an equitable share of the benefits for the Kani. What if this
goodwill did not exist? A mechanism needs to set the process-based
standards by which transfer of genetic materials can occur in a fully
transparent fashion.
173. Anuradha, supra note 24, at 270.
174. See id. at 271. As this plant requires certain specific conditions for its growth,
the scientists at TBGRI believe that it should be grown in its natural habitat provided
that the Kani adopt certain techniques for the plant's cultivation. However,
promising though it may seem, the ownership of the land on which Kani live rests not
with them but with the Forest Department. This necessitates the authorization of
this government entity and illustrates the interlinkages between benefit-sharing
experiments and other rights.
175. See i. TBGRI decided to share 50% of the benefits with the Kani. Of this
amount, TBGRI has suggested awarding 2% to those members of the Kani vwho
initially revealed the knowledge to the scientists and the remaining 4S% to the
benefit of the community as a whole. However, the method of achieving these goals
remains to be determined.
176. See id.
1999]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
(4) Potentially, compensation for a community must be clearly
allocated to 1) the actual raw material provided; 2) an agreed upon
share of royalties and other proceeds; and 3) the knowledge provided
by the community. Although there was compensation given for the
leaves of the Arogyapacha and a share of all benefits received, there
was no clear compensation given for traditional knowledge. Rather
than treating such compensation as implicit within any agreement,
knowledge should be seen as a separate property right with a separate
valuation.
(5) Although all actors to this agreement are located within
India, eventually, there would need to be a mechanism by which to
protect ex situ germplasm. For example, if the genetic material from
the plant had been stored in an international genebank, under current
legislation it would be unprotected from patent-seekers. The Indian
government needs to take the lead in convening an international
convention that can cover this scenario. Evidently, the implications
for local communities are great; such a scenario, here, would have
fully deprived the Kanis from any profit.
(6) As previously stated, some members of the Kani community
are attempting to pass a community intellectual property rights bill.
Even if such a bill were to account for all interests involved, it would
not be able to stem from a state government in a federal democracy.
Rather, there needs to be some coordination of standards among the
states; a coordination which can only come with the implementation
of national legislation. Without national coordination, the state
government lacks the monitoring and enforcement resources
necessary for such a patents regime.
(7) Finally, a lingering question remains as to the existence of
any national and international standards by which to regulate the safe
use of this genetic material.
The process of surveying the Kani settlement and the collection
of leaves began before the adoption of the CBD. Thus, there was no
formal plan in place to determine the structure of the benefit-sharing
arrangement. Nevertheless, this case study provides some lessons of
the practical difficulties associated with the implementation of
coordination and other principles laid out in the CBD and TRIPS.
Although all the players in this experiment were located within India,
much of the friction present here mirrored the friction between
parties in inter-state material transfer agreements. The Kani case
study implicated issues of sovereignty over natural resources,
informed consent, and compensation/benefit-sharing. H-Iowever, it
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also implicated issues of the adequacy of protection over the drug, the
plant, and traditional knowledge. Whereas, the emphasis heretofore
has been placed on safeguarding the interests of the Kani people,
there must be an equal emphasis placed on the interests of the
pharmacy in protecting their creation. Only if all these interests are
considered can the objectives of CBD and TRIPS be reconciled.
Even if India and other developing countries fully consider these
diverse interests in developing their respective pieces of national
legislation, some issues remain unresolved and outside the reach of
any one country for resolution. Only global cooperation will be able
to surmount these barriers. The next section explores two such
issues: the Biosafety Protocol and the deficiencies in U.S. patent law.
IV.Considerations of Justice, Equity, and Ethics
A. Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) and the Biosafety
Protocol
The last concern emerging from the Kani case study is the lack of
standards by which to regulate the safe use of genetic material. As
one study indicates, the transfer of and innovation vith genetic
resources sometimes leads to the creation of new genetic
combinations which supersede existing products and drive the market
because of their advantages."f These new combinations which
involve the modification, improvement, or development of genetic
material by human intervention in a way that does not occur for
specific use are called genetically modified organisms (GMOs). ,
While these GMOs can play a major role in enhancing agriculture, for
example, through faster developments of seed varieties, they can also
have a devastating impact. In fact, associations of farmers in southern
India have launched a campaign against MNCs, such as Monsanto,
which employ technology perceived to be harmful." ' Nevertheless,
the biotechnology industry continues to prosper, with many
companies in industrialized countries wooing developing countries
with the prospect of foreign investment opportunities for their
countries. This increases the pressure for developing countries,
including India, to grant patents for such materials.
177. OECD, supra note 2, at 2S-29.
178. See idU
179. Asha Krishnakumar, A Scientific Conundrum, FRONTLINE (January 30-
Febram-y 12, 1999) <http'/v.vw.the-hindu.com/flineffll603l603t920.htm>.
1999]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
These fears have spurred negotiations to forge a global
biotechnology safety treaty called the Biosafety Protocol.' This
agreement would regulate the shipment between countries of
organisms that have been altered by genetic engineering. However,
disagreements between the United States and most developing
countries have led to a stalemate.1' The most contentious issue
concerns whether agricultural commodities, such as genetically
altered wheat, should be subject to advance permission from the
importing country.1" The latest draft excludes agricultural
commodities from the advanced approval requirements, but
developing countries are attempting to reinsert the requirement for
individual countries that want to keep it." The way talks are
progressing, the words of Sateeaved Seebaluck, the delegate of
Mauritius, ring true: "It would seem that trade has taken over
[biosafety] and what we have is something more resembling a
biotrade protocol."'84 Although talks have stalled, India has taken
over the chairing of the G77 and China' and thus, may be in a
position to take a lead role in negotiations. Although the safe use of
genetic material is not incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement at
present, the gravity of this ethical issue should have been an issue for
negotiation at the ministerial meeting this fall in Seattle.
B. U.S. Patent Law
The TRIPS Agreement allows for countries to decide on a form
of protection over their genetic resources. However, this seeming
"autonomy" granted to nation-states collapses once the differences in
national legislation begin to conflict. In particular, the current
standards of U.S. patent law would seem to undermine the changes
that are being proposed in Indian patent law.
The United States, in addition to some other countries, has
180. Fears include the development of biological warfare capabilities, effect on
unintended targets (such as the production of weed species resistant to herbicides),
transfer of genes to the stomach of consumers, the release of plants that encode viral
sequences, the killing of pests of which beneficial insects prey, whether the improved
gene can counter region-specific toxic effects, and how long the impioved gene can
serve its purpose. See id.
181. Andrew Pollack, Biotechnology Treaty Stalls as U.S. and Developing Nations
Quarrel, N.Y. TIMEs, February 23, 1999.
182. See id.
183. See id.
184. See id.
185. See id.
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decided to allow for patents in the biotechnological industry. '
Although patent law has generally distinguished between
"inventions" which are patentable and "discoveries" which are not,
this distinction has been blurred by the laws in the United States and
in Europe." Particularly troublesome are the ramifications of
Section 102 of the United States Patent Act." Under this provision,
whereas prior knowledge, use, or invention in the United States can
be used as evidence to invalidate a U.S. patent for lack of novelty,
similar foreign activity can not be used against a U.S. patent.' The
only foreign evidence which qualifies to invalidate U.S. patents is an
actual patent, a known or used invention, or an invention that was
described in a printed publication."' This technically narrow
interpretation of 'novelty' remains wedded to the concept of
tangibility and blind to the oral traditions and knowledge of genetic
resources; resources which largely flourish in biodiversity-rich areas' ,
such as India.92 Absent the ability to patent these resources under
current Indian law, perverse incentives are created for biotechnology
firms to take Indian resources abroad, alter these resources, albeit a
minimal alteration which can meet the novelty prong of the
patentability test, and then flood the Indian market with imports of a
resource originally found in India. And because such legal
interpretation does not discriminate in terms of who can secure such
patents, there is no incentive for the U.S. government to change these
laws in order to conform to TRIPS!"
186. Llewelyn, supra note 61.
187. For example, in the United States an isolated and purified form of a natural
product can be patented if it is found in nature only in a non-purified form. In
countries signatory to the European Patent Convention, a patent can b.- granted
when a substance found in nature can be characterized by its structure, by its prozes;
of obtention, or by other criteria, if it is new in a way not pre~iously available to the
public. UNCTAD, supra note 10, at 59.
188. U.S. patent laws are simply illustrative here. The patent lav, s of other
industrialized countries are analogous. Shayana Kadilal, Subject-Matter Imperialism?
Biodiversity, Foreign Prior Art and the Neem Patent Controrersv, 37 IDEA: J.L. &
TECH. 371,1997.
189. See id. at 379.
190. See id.
191. India is one of the 12 megabiodiveristy centers in the world, ranking tenth in
the world for plant diversity. Anuradha, supra note 24, at 267.
192- See id. It is estimated that more than 7,00 kinds of patents are used for
medicinal properties, there are 326 species of wild crop varieties, and more than a
third of all of India's animal and plant species are endemic to India. S%,aminathan,
supra note 27, at 67.
193. Under the MFN clause, on the other hand, one country's patent laws cannot
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To date, at least twenty-two plant genetic resources from India
have been patented, through slight alteration, in the United States-
included in this list are an oil extracted from the naem plant",
turmeric's healing properties, genetically improved basmati rice, and
improved mustard plants." Most recently, properties of the Indian
plant, karela, have been patented in the United States. ' Such actions
fuel the flames of controversy within India as the media presents the
information to the public in a framework decrying the exploitation of
traditional knowledge for corporate profit. Indeed, in August of
1998, India's Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR)
succeeded in its challenge of a U.S. patent for the use of turmeric as a
healing agent and, in so doing, became the first known case where the
use of traditional knowledge base of a developing country patented in
the United States has been successfully challenged." In order to
prevail, attorneys had to scour translated texts to prove that the
powder form of turmeric has been used for healing for several
generations in India.' Earlier, an international protest caused an
Australian entity to abandon its attempt to patent varieties of Indian
chickpeas.' On the other hand, challenges to U.S. patents on neem
products failed.*'° Currently, the same painstaking process that was
used to formulate an effective evidentiary challenge in 'the turmeric
case is being used to prove that, in fact, basmati rice is an intrinsic
part of Indian tradition. This process involves the study of couplets
from 16th century Punjabi fables."'1 Given that these so-called novel
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uses have been in use in India for hundreds of years ', such a
phenomenon begs the question of whether granting such patents truly
fulfills the objectives of the intellectual property regime; that is, are
individuals being rewarded for innovation when the subject matter of
their patents is public domain knowledge, albeit in a foreign country?
Is novelty territorial?
Thus, although developing countries can choose whether to
enlarge the scope of their patent laws in order to protect genetic
resources, they are forced into accepting the ability for developed
countries with broad patent laws to patent plant genetic resources.
which are largely found in developing countries. Furthermore, the
standards to obtain a patent in these developed countries may
discount the importance of foreign knowledge. This is yet another
manifestation of illegitimate patenting, more pejoratively known as
biopiracy. This phenomenon also includes the ability to use seeds
lying in international networks and genetic material deposited in
genebanks. Although these seeds are held in trust, which does not
allow for the patenting of these seeds by third parties, the trust
agreement has been violated on occasion.: ' It appears, therefore,
that regardless of whether developing countries, such as India,
develop a sui generis system for plant genetic resources, the ability for
these resources to be patented abroad and then reinserted back into
the country will hurt India's interests, economic and otherwise.:
permissible because they refer to generic types of aromatic rice which are
ubiquitously found. RiceTec also denies that it took the genetic material used in its
patentable inventions from South Asia. Rather, it claims that the source of the
material is the World Collection of Germplasm in Aberdeen, Idaho. Ho%.ever.
arguments are being made that such use of ex situ germplasm also falls %%ithin the
rubric of biopiracy. Trade & Development Centre, supra note 72.
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Conclusion
If India truly has a steadfast commitment to its relatively new
policy of economic liberalization, the creation of a more expansive
and effective intellectual property rights regime must be part and
parcel of that policy. Such a regime is imperative not only to its role
as a global player, but also to its role as a developing country. Yet,
the creation of such a regime need not herald in a sweeping era of
protection without parameters. Indeed, India should emerge to the
forefront of developing countries as a leader in TRIPS negotiations,
pushing for more equitable trading conditions. It must expose the
disparities in bargaining power between the member countries of the
WTO and press forward for the inclusion of concerns largely found in
developing countries.
One of those concerns is the fierce protection of biodiversity and
genetic resources largely found in developing countries. Not only can
India take the lead in exerting pressure on countries, such as the
United States, to harmonize its own patent laws to meet the
requirements of other countries' patent laws, but it can also lead the
fight for more stringent global biosafety standards. Yet, perhaps the
most crucial manner in which it can take the lead is through the
enactment and implementation of national legislation that reconciles
the objectives of the CBD and of TRIPS.
This author feels that the best protection that India can provide
for genetic resources, from the current alternatives, is a revised form
of the Plant Varieties Act, which would embrace both Plant Breeders'
and Farmers' Rights. Currently, India is the only country in the world
that has proposed both the recognition of Plant Breeders' Rights and
Farmers' Rights. Whether it can set a precedent by realizing such a
juxtaposition of rights remains to be seen. Such a regime of
protection would recognize the need for foreign investment in the
country as well as the potential for biotechnological innovation, and
would safeguard the interests of small farmers and communities who
must remain able to eke out a sustainable lifestyle and protect their
knowledge and resources.
Incentives for different stakeholders to work together must be
made clear by legislation. Those stakeholders with the least
bargaining power, namely local and indigenous communities, must be
brought into consultations at every level. Supplementing any form of
protection, however, there would need to be an inclusion of
mandatory disclosure of the public domain foundation of materials
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and knowledge. For biological materials, it would have to be made
mandatory to disclose the source and method of obtaining the
foundation material. Only then can biodiversity be preserved,
technology flourish, and most importantly, local and indigenous
communities be able to dictate their own terms for their lives.
* * *
